核心摘要 · English Summary
A Financial Times investigation based on hundreds of thousands of leaked internal files shows that A7, a Kremlin-backed payments fintech, moved more than $6.9bn through the international banking system using classic money laundering — shell companies, counterfeit invoices and rewritten customs codes — to disguise payments to Russian state and defence buyers. Accounts at Standard Chartered in Hong Kong alone received $1.1bn, First Abu Dhabi Bank handled $1.8bn of outbound flows, and more than half of the money ended up in Chinese bank accounts. The case exposes how easily correspondent banking controls can be defeated.
核心摘要 · 中文版
《金融时报》依据从 A7 内部取得的数十万份泄露文件完成调查:这家受克里姆林宫扶持的跨境支付金融科技公司,用最传统的洗钱手法——空壳公司、伪造发票、篡改海关编码——把超过 69 亿美元的资金送进国际银行体系,其中部分款项对应军用装备与俄安全部门采购。仅渣打银行香港账户就收到 11 亿美元,阿布扎比第一银行处理了 18 亿美元对外付款,过半资金最终流向中国境内银行账户。本案说明:只要伪造工艺足够工业化,代理行体系那套「依赖汇出行尽职调查」的风控就会被整体绕过。
完整原文 · Full Text
A financial technology company set up with Kremlin backing moved more than $6.9bn through the international banking system despite sanctions on Russia, using an industrial-scale forgery operation to disguise payments to Russian state companies, according to a Financial Times investigation based on hundreds of thousands of leaked internal files.
A7 was established in late 2024 by Ilan Shor, a sanctioned Moldovan oligarch, with the backing of Promsvyazbank, a Russian state-owned lender with close ties to the defence industry. The Kremlin has touted the company as the country's flagship provider of cross-border payments for imports since Russian banks were cut off from the Swift system after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Although A7 has trumpeted its financial innovations, the documents show that it depended on an old-fashioned network of front companies and pre-existing businesses to gain access to Swift, the Belgian messaging network that underpins most international payments.
To conceal the use of those agents, A7 ran what the FT described as an industrial-scale forgery operation to produce counterfeit invoices. Employees altered descriptions of goods, customs codes and other transaction details so that payments would not trigger sanctions screening. In one case, documents relating to the purchase of 500 night-vision scopes for a Russian client were disguised as transactions involving other goods.
A7 also tried to remove what its own staff called the "Russian trace", including by stripping Cyrillic characters from the paperwork.
The scheme exploited a structural feature of Swift: the system relies on the sending bank to carry out adequate checks on its customers and on the underlying trade. Beating the controls of any single member bank was enough to clear the way for A7's payments to travel through the network.
Accounts held at Standard Chartered in Hong Kong alone received $1.1bn from A7-linked entities between late 2024, when A7 was established, and August 2025. Over the same period, DBS in Hong Kong was sent $273mn and Citigroup clients received $74mn. Clients of Deutsche Bank in Europe were sent about $18mn.
A7 opened accounts at First Abu Dhabi Bank, the largest lender in the United Arab Emirates, for 17 different entities, which made more than $1.8bn of outbound payments. It also had the use of accounts at JPMorgan Chase.
The leaked files identify at least 100 to 200 shell companies or similar vehicles used to make payments. At least 87 were registered in Hong Kong, 61 in the UAE, 16 in Kyrgyzstan and 14 in Indonesia.
Chinese bank accounts were the ultimate destination for a little more than half of the flows, the FT found. A7 also used Tether, the dollar-pegged cryptocurrency, to facilitate some transactions. Some of the payments related to highly sensitive war-related goods, including military equipment and purchases made by Russian security services.
First Abu Dhabi Bank told the FT that all of the A7-linked accounts had already been identified and closed, adding that it seeks to apply US, UK, EU and UN sanctions. Standard Chartered, Citigroup, JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank all noted their strong commitment to anti-money-laundering reporting but otherwise declined to comment.
Zach Tvarozna, a former US government banking analyst who published a report on A7 based on an earlier leak from the company, said the new data showed that "the true scale of A7's money-laundering network is much bigger than anyone had previously realised". The material, he added, "should make us think again about how hard it is to keep traditional correspondent banking clean".
语言学习价值 · Vocabulary
长难句拆解 · Sentence Anatomy
| 原句 | Although A7 has trumpeted its financial innovations, the documents show that it depended on an old-fashioned network of front companies and pre-existing businesses to gain access to Swift, the Belgian messaging network that underpins most international payments. |
|---|---|
| 结构拆解 | ① 让步状语从句Although A7 has trumpeted its financial innovations(用现在完成时,强调「一路吹到现在」) ② 主句主干the documents show — 主语 the documents,谓语 show ③ 宾语从句that it depended on an old-fashioned network of front companies and pre-existing businesses — 两个并列名词中心语,靠 of 链式后置定语收拢 ④ 目的状语to gain access to Swift — 不定式说明「搭这个网络是为了接入 Swift」(gain access to 为固定搭配) ⑤ 同位语 + 定语从句Swift, the Belgian messaging network that underpins most international payments — 先用同位语给外行读者下定义,再用 that 从句说明其「支撑全球支付」的地位 |
| 参考译文 | 尽管 A7 一直大肆宣扬自己的金融创新,但文件显示,它靠的其实是一套老掉牙的网络——由前台公司和既有企业组成,用来接入 Swift,也就是支撑全球绝大多数国际支付的比利时报文系统。 |
全文翻译 · Full Translation
以下按原文段落逐段对译,便于中英对照精读。
据《金融时报》一项基于数十万份泄露内部文件的调查,一家受克里姆林宫扶持的金融科技公司,在俄罗斯遭受制裁的情况下,仍把超过 69 亿美元的资金送进了国际银行体系,其手法是一套工业规模的伪造作业,用来掩盖向俄罗斯国有企业付款的事实。
A7 于 2024 年底由受制裁的摩尔多瓦寡头伊兰·绍尔创立,背后是俄罗斯国有银行普罗姆斯维亚兹银行,后者与国防工业关系密切。自 2022 年俄乌全面开战后俄罗斯银行被踢出 Swift 系统以来,克里姆林宫一直把这家公司标榜为俄罗斯进口跨境支付的旗舰服务商。
尽管 A7 一直大肆宣扬自己的金融创新,但文件显示,它靠的其实是一套老掉牙的网络——由前台公司和既有企业组成,用来接入 Swift,也就是支撑全球绝大多数国际支付的比利时报文系统。
为掩盖这些代理主体的存在,A7 实施了《金融时报》所称的「工业规模伪造作业」,批量制造假发票。员工篡改货物描述、海关编码和其他交易细节,使其付款不会触发制裁筛查。其中一个案例是,一笔为俄罗斯客户采购 500 具夜视瞄准镜的单据,被伪装成涉及其他货物的交易。
A7 还试图抹掉自家员工口中的「俄罗斯痕迹」,手段之一是把单据里的西里尔字母全部清除。
这套手法钻的是 Swift 的一项结构性特点:该体系依赖汇出行对自身客户和底层贸易做充分尽调。只要攻破任何一家成员银行的控制,就足以让 A7 的款项在这个网络里通行走账。
仅渣打银行香港的账户,就在 2024 年底 A7 成立至 2025 年 8 月期间,从与 A7 有关联的实体收到 11 亿美元。同期,星展银行香港收到 2.73 亿美元,花旗集团客户收到 7,400 万美元。德意志银行在欧洲的客户收到约 1,800 万美元。
A7 在阿联酋最大银行阿布扎比第一银行为 17 个不同实体开户,这些实体的对外付款超过 18 亿美元。它还使用了摩根大通的账户。
泄露文件显示,用于付款的空壳公司或类似载体至少有 100 至 200 家,其中至少 87 家注册于香港、61 家在阿联酋、16 家在吉尔吉斯斯坦、14 家在印度尼西亚。
《金融时报》发现,这些资金流的最终目的地有一半多一点是中国境内银行账户。A7 还使用与美元挂钩的加密货币 Tether 撮合部分交易。部分款项涉及高度敏感的战争相关物资,包括军用装备以及俄罗斯安全部门的采购。
阿布扎比第一银行对《金融时报》表示,所有与 A7 有关的账户都已被识别并关闭,并称其致力于执行美国、英国、欧盟和联合国的制裁。渣打、花旗、摩根大通和德意志银行均强调自己对反洗钱报告有坚定承诺,但除此之外拒绝置评。
曾在美国政府任银行业分析师的扎克·特瓦罗兹纳,基于该公司更早一次泄漏发布过一份 A7 报告。他说,新数据表明「A7 洗钱网络的真实规模远比此前任何人意识到的都要大」。他补充说,这些材料「应该让我们重新思考:要让传统的代理行体系保持干净,究竟有多难」。